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operators until 8 AM. This enabled Garbo to add more, genuine but now out-
of-date, operational details to the message when nally received, and thus
increase his standing with the Germans. Garbo told his German contacts of
his anger that his message was missed, saying “I cannot accept excuses
or negligence. Were it not for my ideals I would abandon the work.”
On June 9, D-Day +3, GARBO sent perhaps his most important message
of all. It was very long and reported a meeting that he had with his agents
that day. GARBO asked that it be conveyed urgently to the German High
Command. Pointing out that the First US Army Group under Patton had not
yet moved from South East England, GARBO reported authoritatively that
the purpose of the “diversionary” Normandy landings was to help ensure
the success of the forthcoming assault on the Pas de Calais.
The Germans accepted this claim, the culmination of Operation FORTITUDE,
as accurate. It deceived them so completely that throughout July and
August, they kept two armoured divisions and 19 infantry divisions in the
Pas de Calais in anticipation of an invasion. This gave the Allies precious
time to establish their bridgehead.
The German Commander-in-Chief, Field Marshal Gerd von Rundstedt,
was one of those taken in, even to the extent of overruling a proposal from
General Erwin Rommel that his divisions should move from the Pas de
Calais to assist the defence in Normandy. As the Ofcial History of British
Intelligence in WW2 comments, their “intervention in the Normandy battle
really might have tipped the balance”.