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pension to the agent’s widow.
As with all of the double-cross agents, the information supplied was a
mixture of complete ction, genuine military information of little value, and
valuable military intelligence articially delayed, just enough to keep the
belief in his abilities high. In November 1942, just before the Operation
Torch, Garbo’s fake agent on the River Clyde reported that a convoy of
troopships and warships had left port, painted in Mediterranean camouage.
While the letter was sent by airmail and postmarked before the landings, it
was deliberately delayed by British Intelligence in order to arrive too late to
be useful. Pujol received a reply from his German handlers stating “we are
sorry they arrived too late but your last reports were magnicent.”
Pujol was using a ctitious courier, a Royal Dutch Airlines (KLM) pilot to carry
his messages to the Germans. This meant that message deliveries were
limited to the KLM ight schedule and anything important could therefore
be delayed. In 1943 the Germans requested a speedier method so Pujol
and Harris had to invent a radio operator. From August 1943 radio became
the preferred method of communication. The advantage of this was that the
code-breakers at Bletchley Park then had access to both the original text
and the Enigma-encoded intercept of it, the code-breakers had the best
possible source material for a chosen-plaintext attack on the Germans’
Enigma key.
Operation Fortitude
In January 1944, the Germans told Pujol that they believed a large-scale
invasion in Europe was imminent and requested updates. This invasion